

exhibit (“Anselment Aff.”), the November 14, 2023 affidavit of Arndt Nicklisch (“Nicklisch Aff.”) with accompanying exhibits, the December 5, 2023 affidavit of Mei Shibata (“Shibata Aff.”) with accompanying exhibits, the December 11, 2023 affidavit of Adam Greenberg (“Greenberg Aff.”) with accompanying exhibits, the January 10, 2024 affidavit of Rahul Mehendale (“Mehendale Aff.”) with accompanying exhibits, the February 13, 2024 affirmation of Shalendra Ramadhin (“Ramadhin Aff.”) with accompanying exhibits, and the February 14, 2024 affirmation of Ed Jaffe (“Jaffe Aff.”) with accompanying exhibits.

3. After a preliminary investigation, OAG has determined to commence an action under the Martin Act, GBL § 352 *et seq.*, against Artamonov for employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of any false pretense, representation or promise in the issuance, exchange, purchase, sale, promotion, negotiation, advertisement, investment advice or distribution within or from this state of securities or commodities, or for employing deception, concealment, suppression, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or materially false and misleading representations, statements, and omissions in the issuance, exchange, purchase, sale, promotion, negotiation, advertisement, investment advice or distribution within or from this state of securities or commodities.

4. OAG seeks an order pursuant to GBL § 354 directing Respondent to appear before a justice of the supreme court or designated referee and answer such questions as may be put to him by OAG, and to produce books and records which are material and necessary to OAG’s ongoing investigation.

5. To avoid continuing harm to investors, OAG also requests preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to GBL § 354 pending the completion of the investigation. Specifically, OAG seeks to enjoin Artamonov from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive and illegal acts, and to further

restrain and enjoin Artamonov from employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false pretense, representation or promise, including but not limited to engaging in any business related to the issuance, distribution, exchange, promotion, advertisement, negotiation, purchase, investment advice, or sale of securities or commodities, wherever they may be situated.

6. Likewise, OAG seeks to preliminarily restrain Respondent from withdrawing, converting, transferring, selling or otherwise disposing of funds and assets held by any bank, brokerage account, or cryptocurrency platform or wallet, wherever they may be situated, over which Respondent directly or indirectly exercises control or has an ownership interest. The purpose of this restraint is to prevent Artamonov from dissipating assets that should be used to repay Artamonov's investors.

7. Attached to this affirmation as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 are the *ex parte* orders pursuant to GBL § 354 that were granted in the matters of *James v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, Index No. 451652/2021 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. June 15, 2021) ([NYSCEF Doc. No. 9](#)), *James v. iFinex, Inc.*, Index No. 450545/2019 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 24, 2019) ([NYSCEF Doc. No. 35](#)); and *Underwood v. Allen*, Index No. 452346/2018 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Dec. 28, 2018) ([NYSCEF Doc. No. 18](#)).

A. Artamonov Ran a Fraudulent Investment Fund that Targeted HBS Alumni

8. Artamonov attended Harvard Business School ("HBS") and graduated in 2003 with a Master's in Business Administration. After graduating, Artamonov moved to New York, registered with New York state as a securities professional and worked in the financial services industry, including at Greenlight Capital. Artamonov also worked as a managing partner of the hedge fund Coastal Investment Management, L.P, a position Artamonov held through at least

February 27, 2023. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 4 at Schedule A, Feb. 27, 2023 Coastal Investment Management L.P. Form ADV.)

9. From on or about October 13, 2017, through on or about January 2, 2023, Respondent resided at 241 West 4th Street, Apartment PFT 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10012.

10. Though Artamonov was once registered as a securities professional in New York, Respondent has not been registered as a securities broker-dealer, securities salesperson, or securities investment adviser in the State of New York since at least September 14, 2021, through the present (the “Relevant Period”). (Jaffe Aff. ¶¶ 5-10.) Nor has Respondent been subject to any exemptions from the registration requirements in the State of New York during the Relevant Period.

11. From September 2021 through the present, Artamonov solicited money from the public for an investment fund that he called “Project Information Arbitrage” (the “Artamonov Fund” or the “Fund”).

12. Artamonov identified potential investors through the HBS Alumni network. Many of the Fund’s investors did not have a close personal relationship with Artamonov when they invested in the Fund.

13. Confidential Investor No. 1 attended HBS with Artamonov in and around 2003. In or around November 2022, Artamonov contacted Confidential Investor No. 1 through an instant messaging platform to solicit his investment in the Artamonov Fund. Confidential Investor No. 1 did not recall speaking to Artamonov for 18 years prior to receiving this call. He invested a total of \$200,000 in the Fund via three separate wire transfers between November 25, 2022, and January 13, 2022.

14. Rahul Mehendale attended HBS with Artamonov in and around 2003 and recalled seeing Artamonov on occasion at group social gatherings organized by former HBS classmates. (Mehendale Aff. ¶¶ 5-6.) On December 18, 2022, Artamonov texted Mehendale to solicit his investment in the Fund. (*See id.* ¶¶ 8-9.) Mehendale invested \$50,000 in the Fund on January 27, 2023. (*Id.* ¶ 17.)

15. Mei Shibata graduated from HBS in 2003. (Shibata Aff. ¶ 4.) She recalled first meeting Artamonov at a social gathering in New York, New York in late 2020 or early 2021. (*Id.* ¶¶ 6-7.) Artamonov called her on February 27, 2023 to solicit her investment and on March 14, 2023, Shibata invested \$30,000 in the Artamonov Fund. (*Id.* ¶¶ 8-12.)

16. In total, Artamonov received a minimum of \$2.9 million in investments in the Artamonov Fund from at least 29 investors.

17. Unbeknownst to Artamonov's investors, the Fund was a fraud pursuant to which Artamonov: (1) misrepresented his investment strategy and lost the majority of his investors' funds in undisclosed trades; (2) concealed losses from his investors; (3) used new investors' money to repay more senior investors; and (4) used investors' money to pay for personal expenses.

B. Artamonov Misrepresented His Investment Strategy to Investors

18. Artamonov misrepresented his investment strategy to convince investors to give them money and then used investors' funds to make trades that did not coincide with the strategy Artamonov described to his investors when soliciting money.

19. In telephone calls, Artamonov informed investors that his Fund would invest in the same stocks as Berkshire Hathaway ("Berkshire"). Artamonov claimed that he could identify the stocks Berkshire intended to invest in ahead of the market by researching public state insurance filings. He informed investors that he had conducted research or "back-testing" on this

investment thesis and had learned that this strategy would generate a positive return on investment, potentially as high as 5-10x returns. (Shibata Aff. ¶ 8; Mehendale Aff. ¶ 10.) Artamonov informed his investors that he would pay profits to his investors using the gains the Fund made by deploying this strategy. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 5 at *5,¹ *7, Nov. 23, 2022 Email from V. Artamonov.)

20. Artamonov informed his investors that the Fund would be operated as a “pooled investment by a group of friends.” (Shibata Aff., Exhibit 2, Feb. 27, 2023 Email from V. Artamonov.)

21. Artamonov in fact pooled investors’ moneys in his personal accounts, including his personal Bank of America checking account with account number ending in 6373, and his personal Charles Schwab brokerage account with account number ending in 9124 (the “Charles Schwab Account”).

22. Artamonov informed investors that their investments in the Fund would be “passive” for the investors and would “be managed by [Artamonov] based on [his] research.” (Mehendale Aff. ¶ 15.)

23. In emails to investors, Artamonov described the Fund’s investment strategy as follows:

It is really a ridiculous information arbitrage. It is a discrepancy in timing between public State filings and public Federal SEC filings. Basically getting tomorrow’s newspaper today. Literally having a private time machine[.] We will cycle every quarter.

I want to make hundreds of millions of dollars with this.... It uses all public government information and after months of research I was shocked the arbitrage exists and persists so strongly. It is just complicated and weird.

¹ Page numbers marked with a “*” indicate that they are referring to the PDF page numbers shown in PDF software.

(Andreu Aff., Exhibit 5 at *6, Nov. 23, 2022 Email from V. Artamonov (emphasis in original).)

24. In fact, Artamonov's trades consisted of short-term options that expired just days after Artamonov bought them. Many of these trades had no overlap with either Berkshire's investment portfolio or SEC reporting deadlines.

25. For example, on December 8, 2022, the Artamonov Fund purchased call options for the stock of Nucor Corp., with an expiration of December 9, 2022. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 6 at 13, Dec. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) On December 9, 2022, these options expired, causing the Artamonov Fund to realize a loss of \$31,829.73. (*Id.*)

26. Berkshire has informed OAG that it held no shares of Nucor Corp. in the third or fourth quarters in 2022.

27. Similarly, on December 13, 2022, the Artamonov Fund bought call options for the stock of JM Smucker Co., with an expiration of December 16, 2022. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 6 at 17, Dec. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) On December 16, 2022, these options expired, causing the Artamonov Fund to realize a loss of \$10,763.78. (*Id.*)

28. Berkshire filed no new documents with the SEC from December 13, 2022, through December 16, 2022. Thus, Artamonov's JM Smucker Co. trades could not have benefitted from the "information arbitrage" he described in his November 23, 2022 investor email.

29. Berkshire has informed OAG that it held no shares of JM Smucker Co. in the third or fourth quarters in 2022.

30. Finally, on multiple dates in December 2022, the Artamonov Fund purchased call options for the stock of Farfetch Ltd., with an expiration of December 16, 2022. (Andreu Aff.,

Exhibit 6 at 17, Dec. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) On December 16, 2022, these options expired, causing the Artamonov Fund to realize a loss of \$18,243.16. (*Id.*)

31. As with the other stocks, Berkshire has informed OAG that it held no position in Farfetch, Ltd. in the third or fourth quarters in 2022.

32. Thus, Artamonov’s “information arbitrage” strategy—which purportedly sought to take advantage of “a discrepancy in timing between public State filings and public Federal SEC filings” concerning Berkshire’s holdings—could not explain Artamonov’s short-term options trades in stocks that were not part of Berkshire’s portfolio, and which expired before any new SEC filings could expose Berkshire’s new investments.

C. Artamonov Lied to Investors About Millions in Losses

33. Employing the trading strategy described above, Artamonov lost more than \$2 million of investors’ assets on high-risk options trades. Rather than disclose these losses to his investors, Artamonov lied.

34. For example, Arndt Nicklisch invested \$50,000 with Artamonov on September 15, 2022, and another \$50,000 on September 30, 2022. (Nicklisch Aff. ¶¶ 10-13.) Artamonov lost these funds from October through November 2022; by the end of the day on November 30, 2022, Artamonov’s Charles Schwab Account held a balance of just \$5,123.70. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 7 at 3, Nov. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) Artamonov never disclosed these losses to Nicklisch. (Nicklisch Aff. ¶ 29.)

35. On December 19, 2022, Nicklisch inquired about the status of his investment, texting Artamonov: “How are those trades going?” In response, Artamonov said nothing about his losses in the months prior. Instead, on December 19, 2022, Artamonov responded: “Pretty quiet this month. Have to sit on your ass and pounce when they surface.” (*Id.* ¶ 22.) In other

words, Artamonov led Nicklisch to believe that he had made few, if any, trades in December 2022.

36. This was false. December was not a quiet month for the Artamonov Fund. In December 2022, the Charles Schwab Account received \$379,776.19 from new investors in the Artamonov Fund, but experienced losses of \$313,669.56 on trades and investments. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 6 at 3, Dec. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) Artamonov made dozens of trades using the Charles Schwab Account between December 1, 2022, and December 19, 2022. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 6 at 24-176, Dec. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement).

37. Likewise, Adam Greenberg initially invested \$100,000 on October 26, 2022. (Greenberg Aff. ¶ 11.) Artamonov promptly lost virtually all of these funds. In November 2022 alone, Artamonov's net losses on the investments in his Charles Schwab Account totaled \$535,810.79. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 7 at 3, Nov. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) As already set forth in paragraph 34, above, by November 30, 2022, Artamonov's Charles Schwab Account balance had fallen to just \$5,123.70. Artamonov never disclosed these losses to Greenberg.

38. On December 28, 2022, Greenberg texted Artamonov to ask if there were any updates regarding his investment in the Artamonov Fund. Once again, Artamonov kept silent regarding his loss of Greenberg's money. Instead, Artamonov responded: "December was super quiet. No fireworks yet. Just have to sit and wait for when it strikes. So nothing to do for now." (Greenberg Aff. ¶ 15.) But as demonstrated above December was not in fact quiet. In addition to the dozens of trades Artamonov made from December 1 to 19, 2022, Artamonov made dozens more trades from December 19 to 28, 2022. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 6 at 176-236, Dec. 2022

Charles Schwab Account Statement.) By the end of the day on December 31, 2022, Artamonov's Charles Schwab Account balance was just \$21,192.96. (*Id.* at 3.)

39. Rather than disclose these losses to Greenberg, Artamonov concealed those losses while he solicited more money from Greenberg.

40. In January 2022, Artamonov told Greenberg that he was accepting new investments in the Fund and asked if Greenberg would like to invest more money. (Greenberg Aff. ¶¶ 17-18.) On February 7, and 10, 2023, Greenberg invested an additional \$50,000 in the Artamonov Fund. (*Id.* ¶¶ 19-20.) Artamonov did not inform Greenberg on or before February 10, 2023, that he had already lost Greenberg's initial \$100,000 investment. (*Id.* ¶¶ 17, 28.)

41. Artamonov also concealed these losses from new investors in the Fund by falsely projecting the Fund's profitability.

42. Two of the new investors Artamonov accepted into the Fund in 2023 were Mehendale and Shibata. In January 2023, Artamonov informed Mehendale that his "back-testing" indicated that the Fund's strategy could generate 5-10x return on investment. (Mehendale Aff. ¶ 10.) Similarly, in a February 27, 2023 phone call, Artamonov told Shibata that he had conducted research that indicated the Artamonov Fund's strategy would earn a positive return on investment. (Shibata Aff. ¶ 8.) Further, in a March 9, 2023 text message, Artamonov told Shibata that her investment in the Fund would be a "ridiculously good investment." (*Id.* ¶ 12.)

43. These claims were contradicted by the massive investment losses Artamonov sustained in 2022, including losing nearly \$1 million from September 2022 through December 2022 alone. (*See supra* ¶¶ 34-36.) Without knowledge of these losses, and as set forth above,

Mehendale invested \$50,000 on January 27, 2023 (Mehendale Aff. ¶ 17) and Shibata invested \$30,000 on March 14, 2023 (Shibata Aff. ¶ 13).

D. Artamonov Used Investor Funds for Personal Expenses

44. Artamonov also used his investors' moneys to fund unauthorized personal expenses.

45. Artamonov did not tell investors that he would use their assets for personal expenses. (Nicklisch Aff. ¶ 16; Shibata Aff. ¶ 20; Greenberg Aff. ¶ 23; Mehendale Aff. ¶ 34.) Nor did his investors authorize Artamonov to use their money to fund his personal expenses. (Nicklisch Aff. ¶ 16; Shibata Aff. ¶ 20; Greenberg Aff. ¶ 23; Mehendale Aff. ¶ 34.) The only fee Artamonov disclosed he would take was a 20% fee from any gains in excess of the capital invested in the Fund. (Nicklisch Aff. ¶¶ 7, 14; Shibata Aff. ¶¶ 14, 18; Greenberg Aff. ¶¶ 12, 21; Mehendale Aff. ¶¶ 11, 32.)

46. Nevertheless, Artamonov repeatedly used his investors' funds for personal expenses.

47. For example, in December 2022, Artamonov used the Charles Schwab Account containing investor money to pay a \$323.94 bill at a New York City restaurant called Quality Eats, to make a \$247.28 purchase on Amazon, and to spend \$304.77 at a grocery store. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 6 at 238, Dec. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.)

48. Similarly, in May 2022, Artamonov paid \$1,977.09 to the vacation rental platform AirBNB using his Charles Schwab Account. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 8 at 26, May 2023 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) In the same month, Artamonov spent more than \$700 using the Charles Schwab Account on more than a dozen purchases at Target, Amazon, and food delivery applications such as Seamless. (*Id.* at 25-27.)

E. Artamonov Operated His Fund as a Ponzi Scheme

49. Artamonov's losses and misappropriation of investor funds left him unable to repay existing investors. Thus, when Artamonov's investors requested their money back, Artamonov used new investors' funds to satisfy those withdrawal demands.

50. In total, Artamonov repaid at least seven investors a minimum of \$431,200 using new investors' funds during the Relevant Period.

51. For example, on September 30, 2023, Artamonov received a \$50,000 wire transfer from Arndt Nicklisch for investment in the Fund. (Nicklisch Aff. ¶ 13.) Artamonov transferred \$46,300 of that \$50,000 into his Charles Schwab Account on October 3, 2022. (Ramadhin Aff., Exhibit 1 at 133, Oct. 2022 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) Then on October 4, 2022, Artamonov used the Charles Schwab account to wire \$56,000 to a prior investor in the Artamonov Fund, Adaptive Ansible, Inc. (Ramadhin Aff., Exhibit 3, Oct. 4, 2022 Wire Transfer Confirmation.)

52. Without Nicklisch's \$50,000 investment, the Charles Schwab Account would have had insufficient cash to fund the \$56,000 wire transfer to Adaptive Ansible, Inc. (Ramadhin Aff. ¶¶ 11-12.)

53. Then, in or around April 2023, Nicklisch and Mehendale asked Artamonov to return the money they invested in the Artamonov Fund. (Nicklisch Aff. ¶ 24; Mehendale Aff. ¶ 23.)

54. On April 25, 2023, Artamonov received a \$250,000 wire transfer from Confidential Investor No. 2 into his Charles Schwab Account. (Ramadhin Aff., Exhibit 2 at 87, Apr. 2023 Charles Schwab Account Statement.) Confidential Investor No. 2 informed OAG that he wired \$250,000 to the Charles Schwab Account for investment in the Fund on April 25, 2023,

and that he did not authorize Artamonov to use any portion of this \$250,000 to repay other investors.

55. Nevertheless, on the same day as Confidential Investor No. 2's investment, Artamonov wired \$150,000 to Nicklish from his Charles Schwab Account and \$50,000 to Mehendale. (Ramadhin Aff., Exhibit 4, Apr. 25, 2023 A. Nicklisch Wire Transfer Confirmation; Andreu Aff., Ex. 9 Apr. 25, 2023 R. Mehendale Wire Transfer Confirmation.)

56. Without Confidential Investor No. 2's \$250,000 investment on April 25, 2023, the Charles Schwab Account would have had insufficient cash to fund the \$150,000 wire transfer to Nicklisch. (Ramadhin Aff. ¶ 15.) Nor would it have had sufficient funds to wire \$50,000 to Mehendale.

F. Artamonov's Fraud Has Had Tragic Consequences

57. From nearly the outset of his fraud, Artamonov's scheme has had tragic consequences.

58. One of the earliest investors in the Artamonov fund was Confidential Investor No. 3. According to Confidential Investor No. 3's brother, on February 3, 2022, Confidential Investor No. 3 committed suicide after investing and losing \$100,000 with Artamonov from October 2021 through December 2021.

59. On February 17, 2022, Confidential Investor No. 3's brother told Artamonov of Confidential Investor No. 3's death via telephone.

60. This tragedy did not discourage Artamonov from continuing his fraudulent investment fund and losing millions of dollars' worth of other investors' assets. Indeed, virtually all the conduct described above occurred after Artamonov learned of Confidential Investor No. 3's death on February 17, 2022.

G. Artamonov Has Failed to Comply with OAG's Subpoena

61. On July 10, 2023, OAG issued a subpoena *duces tecum* to Artamonov in connection with this investigation (the "July 10, 2023 Subpoena"). (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 10, July 10, 2023 Subpoena to V. Artamonov.)

62. Pursuant to N.Y. GBL § 352-b, that subpoena *duces tecum* was personally delivered to the New York State Secretary of State on July 12, 2023, and was subsequently sent via certified mail, return receipt requested, to Artamonov's last known addresses. OAG received a signed return receipt for this package on or about July 31, 2023 from an address in California. (Anselment Aff.)

63. Artamonov did not respond to that subpoena *duces tecum* by the August 7, 2023 return date. On August 9, 2023, OAG emailed Artamonov, with the July 10, 2023 subpoena *duces tecum* attached, and informed Artamonov that he had failed to respond to that subpoena. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 11, Aug. 9, 2023 Email from G. Andreu to V. Artamonov.)

64. On August 10, 2023, Christopher Warren, an attorney and managing partner of the Warren Law Group, reached out to OAG on behalf of Artamonov to inform OAG that he was meeting with Artamonov to discuss representation, and to request an extension of time to respond on Artamonov's behalf. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 12, Aug. 10, 2023 Email from C. Warren to G. Andreu.)

65. On August 18, 2023, Mr. Warren informed OAG via email that his firm did not represent Artamonov. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 13, Aug. 18, 2023 Email from C. Warren to G. Andreu.)

66. On August 24, 2023, at 8:01 a.m. eastern time, Artamonov personally called OAG and requested an additional extension while he retained counsel in connection with this matter.

OAG granted an extension until August 31, 2023. (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 14, Aug. 24, 2023 Email from G. Andreu to V. Artamonov.)

67. Artamonov failed to contact OAG, through counsel or otherwise, at any time after August 24, 2023. To date, Respondent has produced no documents and provided no information in response to the July 10, 2023 Subpoena.

68. Rather than secure counsel or request additional time to do so, in an August 28, 2023 email to four of his investors, Artamonov asked those investors to agree to “release Vlad Artamonov from legal liabilities in all jurisdictions in all of our dealings.” (Andreu Aff., Exhibit 15, Aug. 28, 2023 Email from V. Artamonov to I. Kandel.) Artamonov sent this email just four days after OAG granted an extension of time to respond to the July 10, 2023 Subpoena.

69. On or about November 8, 2023, months after OAG received a signed return receipt indicating that the July 10, 2023 Subpoena had been delivered (*see supra* ¶ 62), the post office returned to OAG its package containing the July 10, 2023 Subpoena with the notation “Return to Sender, Insufficient Address, Unable to Forward.”

70. The documents and information requested in the July 10, 2023 Subpoena relate to a number of key issues in the investigation, including but not limited to: (i) investor communications and any documentation or term sheets provided to investors; (ii) the total number of investors and total value of investments in the Artamonov Fund; (iii) the identification of any additional bank and brokerage accounts and statements for those accounts; (iv) the flow of funds invested in the Artamonov Fund; and (v) Artamonov’s adherence to his stated investment strategy.

71. The Proposed Order requires production of all documents and communications responsive to the July 10, 2023 Subpoena, as well as all documents and communications

concerning any non-investment expenses incurred by Artamonov's Charles Schwab Account from September 14, 2021 to the present, including but not limited to Artamonov's communications with AirBNB concerning the \$1,977.09 charge in May 2022.

72. The Proposed Order also requires Artamonov to appear and testify in connection with his role in the Artamonov Fund.

73. The Proposed Order requires personal service on Artamonov. However, in the event OAG is unsuccessful in personally serving Artamonov, the Proposed Order provides for alternative means of service that are reasonably calculated to ensure Artamonov receives actual notice of this action.

74. Based on OAG's records and documents, Artamonov's last known address is 552 Summit Drive, Emerald Hills, CA 94062-3352.

75. Artamonov maintains an email address of vartamonov1@gmail.com. OAG has successfully contacted Artamonov through this email address (see *supra* ¶¶ 63-64), and Artamonov has used this email in connection with the fraudulent scheme set forth herein (see, e.g., Andreu Aff., Exhibit 15, Aug. 28, 2023 Email from V. Artamonov to I. Kandel.)

76. Thus, if OAG is unsuccessful in personally serving Artamonov after two good faith attempts, the Proposed Order permits service of a certified copy of the Order together with the papers upon which it was granted by: (1) sending such papers by registered or certified mail with return receipt requested to Respondent's last known address of 552 Summit Drive, Emerald Hills, CA 94062-3352; (2) emailing such papers to Respondent's email address (vartamonov1@gmail.com); and (3) personally delivering such papers to the New York Secretary of State or a Deputy Secretary of State at the Office of the Department of State in the city of Albany.

H. Artamonov's Fraud Is Ongoing

77. Rather than comply with OAG's subpoena, Artamonov has sought to continue his fraudulent scheme while under investigation by OAG. In an interview with OAG at the end of November 2023, Confidential Investor No. 2 told OAG that Artamonov telephoned him on September 19, 2023—a few weeks after Artamonov personally requested an extension from OAG—and asked for more money for a new investment venture. At that time, Artamonov did not inform Confidential Investor No. 2 that he had used Confidential Investor No. 2's prior investment to pay other investors.

78. Because of the potential for Artamonov to dissipate assets or evade service if given advance notice of the Proposed Order, Artamonov has not been given notice of this application.

79. No previous application for the relief requested in the Proposed Order has been made by OAG to this or any other Court.

Dated: February 23, 2024
New York, New York



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